British sanctions on settlements face test after Israel election

Britain’s new sanctions against Israeli settlements failed to prevent the incumbent prime minister from securing a larger share of the popular vote than his main rival, according to exit polls from the October 27 election. While Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and its allies fell short of the 61 seats needed for a governing majority, the bloc received more total votes than the change bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot.

The result complicates the assessment of a diplomatic strategy that relied on economic pressure to shift Israeli policy. The measures were announced just weeks before voters cast their ballots, raising questions about whether foreign intervention helped or hindered the targeted government.

The timeline of events began in June 2025, when Britain, alongside Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway, sanctioned National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich. Those initial measures cited alleged incitement of violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. The situation escalated on September 8, 2026, when British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband unveiled a new package targeting settlement expansion.

The September measures included an import ban on goods produced in settlements and restrictions on specific individuals and companies involved in settlement growth. The British government stated that these actions targeted settlement activity specifically, rather than Israel within its internationally recognized borders.

Miliband addressed concerns about the timing in Parliament, where he argued that Britain was not interfering in the election. He stated that the election was for the Israeli people to decide their future and clarified that the government’s quarrel was with the policies of the Netanyahu administration, not the Israeli people. He added that the international community could not wait for an opposition government to take office before acting.

Critics, including shadow foreign secretary Tom Tugendhat, argued that the timing benefited the far right. A report by The Spectator, later covered by Globes, alleged that British diplomats and intelligence officials warned that pre-election sanctions risked affecting Israeli politics. According to that report, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar had asked Miliband to delay the measures until after the vote.

Sa’ar publicly rejected the move on September 8, accusing the UK of blatant interference in a sovereign state’s affairs. He described the timing as an unacceptable attempt to exert external influence during an active campaign.

The election results suggest the pressure did not unify the opposition or weaken Netanyahu’s base as some analysts hoped. Netanyahu’s bloc fell short of a parliamentary majority, but Likud outperformed Eisenkot’s Yashar party, which had been projected to do better in pre-election polls. The high turnout and the specific seat counts do not prove that sanctions determined the outcome, as voters also weighed the aftermath of the October 7 attacks, security confidence, and economic costs.

The British government maintains that the goal is to restrict the economic activity supporting settlements and preserve the possibility of a two-state solution. The next step is the implementation of these restrictions. Success will be measured by whether the measures effectively limit settlement growth and alter the calculations of those involved, independent of which government eventually takes office.

For now, the sanctions have entered the political debate as a point of contention between sovereignty and international pressure. The available electoral figures do not establish that the measures changed the final result, but they have become a fixed part of the diplomatic landscape between London and Jerusalem.